catachrestic ([info]catachrestic) wrote,
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I don't get no... RE-DUK-SH-UN!

Since unfortunately many people remain unaware, I'd like to dedicate this entry to one of the beneficial yet often overlooked tangential consequences of evolutionary science and genetics. Before you flick that mouse in a boredom reflex, keep in mind that this entry is really about a lot of unimaginative rhetoric that you (yes you!) probably find convincing, or at least compelling, but which is really nothing more than uneducated, uncreative flop.

And here's the flop: Arguments from Irreducibility. Let me give you a famous example of what I mean. It has been argued that the mind cannot be reduced to the biological brain and body. From this, many people have deduced a couple of absurd and unimaginitive things. Firstly, some people have taken this as evidence that the mind and the brain cannot be made of the same basic, fundamental substance. In other words, they take the irreducibility of the mind as evidence for the soul. This is by far the most extreme form of this dogma, but there is also a less extreme form. This lesser form still relies upon the irreducibility of the mind to the brain, but instead merely asserts that the brain is irrelevent in any description or explanation of the mind. Thus, arguments from irreducibility take these basic forms, no matter the subject, whereby the failure to reduce one thing to another is proposed as evidence for the denial of some sort of identity, whether that identity is metaphysical or just descriptive and/or explanatory.

Aside from the example of reducing minds to brains, there are other things which can't be reduced too. This is where genetics and evolutionary science come in, because they give us a model for how different levels of things can build upon one another, even though you can't perform any reduction from one level to the other. For instance, the phenotype cannot be reduced to the genotype. I don't see anyone suggesting, however, that this indicates that the genotype serves no role in any explanation of the phenotype. A lot of people still don't really understand any of this, not even a lot of well-trained professional philosophers, so let me spell it out. Most of the information about your body and its development is actually not contained in your DNA at all. Really, all your DNA really does is map the construction of proteins. It's the proteins, and their behavior when mixed together appropriately, which does most of the work in the further development of your body. Moreover, in this complicated mix of proteins and chemistry, sometimes proteins can actually go back and effect the DNA and how it does its job. For instance, they might set off triggers which turn some parts of the DNA on or off. In some cases proteins can actually go back and change the very structure of the DNA itself. This creates complicated layers of conflict between different levels, whereby the emergent properties of the original instructions actually go on to effect the original instructions themselves. Of course, you can imagine how this could snowball and pile new layers upon new layers, new levels upon new levels.

To help in illustrating this, let's call the original DNA blueprint 'DNA-1', and let's call the newly manipulated DNA blueprint 'DNA-2' (i.e., this is what happens to the DNA after the proteins that were created by DNA-1 go back and effect it). Once you have DNA-2, then you also alter the types of proteins that are being mapped. Thus, DNA-2 goes on to generate a new soup of proteins, which interacts with the old soup of proteins, which creates a whole new level of protein interaction that wasn't even contained within the original protein soup, let alone the original DNA blueprint. Try to really imagine this now. At this point, not only can the new soup of proteins itself contain ways to possibly go back and create a DNA-3, but it isn't even necessarily by itself; The protein soup left over from DNA-1 might interact with the new soup from DNA-2 to create a whole new level of protein interaction, the behavior of which could create a DNA-4 before we even get the chance to talk about a DNA-3. Long story short: a third protein soup is created from the mixture of the one generated from DNA-1 and the one generated from DNA-2, the behavior of which is totally unpredictable given the information contained in either DNA-1 or DNA-2. Hopefully I'm setting off ripples in your mind at this point. Obviously the process doesn't stop here, and it could seemingly go on infinitely, whereby the DNA keeps creating proteins that keep going back and altering the DNA itself. You could end up with DNA-99999999 for all I know.

But this isn't even the end of it. At this point I should distinguish between 'layers' and 'levels'. For instance, DNA-1 and DNA-2 are both examples of different layers within the same level. The difference between levels, on the other hand, is illustrated by distinguishing between DNA and the protein soups that they generate. Thus, the protein soups created by the DNA operate on another level-- that of protein interaction-- than that of the level of the DNA itself. Here's an amazing thing to realize now that I've explained this: In the same way that the layers can build upon each other (DNA-1, DNA-2, DNA-3, etc...) so also can the levels build upon one another. So, we might speak of an esculating complexity of levels too. For instance, in the same way that DNA generates a new level of proteins, the interactions of proteins can also create new levels. In fact, it eventually looks kind of like this: DNA, Protein Soups, Cells, Tissues, Organs, Body Systems, Organism, Behavior, Society, Ecology, etc etc. And of course, as with the way that the level of the protein soups can go back and make changes on the level of DNA, so might any of these levels reach back upon levels before them. Can you even begin to wrap your mind around the intricate complexity with which the DNA molecule builds an organism?

After all of this, here's my point. As the levels build upon themselves, this process continues to esculate until you have a fully functioning human being that can write poetry, fall in love, and invent Incompleteness Theorums. If you have enough of these human beings, then this can esculate until you have fully functioning societies and civilizations. By the way, all of which wouldn't be here at all if it wasn't for that original DNA-1 blueprint, even though absolutely none of it could EVER, in a million billion years even, be predicted-- not even in principle-- based upon that original blueprint. The fact that reduction is an impossible task does not somehow open the doors for supernatural realms, nor does it mean that fundamental levels are not a necessary and important part of the explanation of any phenomenon.

So, arguments against identity which rely upon irreducibility are flawed. Even worse: they're unimaginitive. The creative process itself is a building of levels upon levels, in such an intricate way that a perfect reduction back to the artist is inconceivable. But at the same time, taking the artist out of the art is often to miss the whole point of what is being conveyed. Whether you're building a theory about the mind or a theory about biology (incidentally they probably ought to inform one another!), you must have a strong wish for simple-mindedness to be convinced by the kind of sophistry or rhetoric of an argument from irreducibility alone. In fact, understanding how levels build upon one another in spite of being irreducible is fundamental to an understanding of so many fields of philosophy. Take, for example, the ultimate pursuit of cosmology: To have a theory of everything, whereby the leading theories for the macro-world (Relativity) are seemingly irreducible to the leading theories of the micro-world (Quantum Physics).

On the other hand, if you're so befuddled by the puzzles of irreducibility, then you probably are a brain without a mind.

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  • 26 comments

[info]force_of_will

August 8 2005, 13:48:06 UTC 6 years ago

I've never taken it as proof of the existence, yet I take I take the approach that we are stuck with it based on our linguistic rooted understanding. That map isn't done and as long as its done there remains a divide. Perhaps the question is how useful it ultimately is for us to use those constructs, which when given value through intersubjective agreement, lead us into having an objective feeling about this dualism.

My general belief, based on mapping limitations, is that we are stuck with the divide, but we shoudl see it for what it is, as you point out here.

[info]catachrestic

August 9 2005, 06:18:53 UTC 6 years ago

Which divide are you referring to exactly? I assume a dichotomy between body and mind?

I don't think there is any sort of linguistic predestination that forces us into a dichotomy that says 'either they are identical and reducible or they are separate and irreducible'. I think we have plenty of room to wiggle around and offer explanations for phenomena without having to characterize things this way. In fact, I think my example above from genetics gives us some of the tools... I can tell a coherent story about how DNA is able to blueprint the construction of an organism through a chain of imaginable events, despite the fact that the abstract organism can never fundamentally be reduced to the original DNA blueprint...

Reduction is not necessary in the telling of this story at all.

It's in this sense that I want to loosen up what is meant by 'identity'...

[info]force_of_will

August 10 2005, 16:40:02 UTC 6 years ago

I'll first warn you that in reading over this before posting, its my typical scatteredness...

Well, all of the "objects" of the mind, we represent, more or less, linguistically, while the brain is a physical object, and while your analogous examples are of levels of the physical.

My tendency is, hmmm, similar to yours, but I add limit to it. Thus limited reducibility yeilds limited correspondence. For me this comes out of physics, which you mention at the end. The probability needed to predict the position of matter figures into brain mind mapping for me and is a limiting factor. In this case correspondence is not a problem, ultimate correspondence is.

The other "problem" I see is that the corrsepondence has a level outside of the brain mind relation which is the world. My belief is that mystery is never going to be removed from the world, and mystery is the root of such divides. The only route for possibly removing mystery would be for the will of man to "re-write" the cosmos. And I say only "possibly" because I'm not sure that we can control end levels that we are unsure we even understand. That is there seems to be a level of "random" noise at the micro.

[info]tiresias2

August 12 2005, 08:53:06 UTC 6 years ago

Well, lots of 'big issues' here. Let me just raise some questions for further discussion...

What do you mean by 'correspondence' here between brain and mind? I'm a little uncertain about how you're using the terminology here relative to my post. For instance, let's use the example of genetics that I use above. In what sense does limited reducibility between, say, the organism and the DNA mean that there is limited correspondence between the organism and the DNA? Really I'm just not sure what is meant by 'correspondence' here.

Are you just using 'correspondence' as a synonym for 'reducible'? As I say above, I acknowledge that the organism is not reducible to the DNA. What I deny is the view that this prevents us from giving an explanation about how the organism develops from the DNA. There are other modes of satisfactory explanation which do not require reduction.

Thus, no matter how you are using 'correspondence', I feel like my response will probably be "limited correspondence does not mean a limited explanation".

[info]anosognosia

August 8 2005, 14:05:03 UTC 6 years ago

I wonder about your use of 'identity' here. Phenotype and genotype aren't identical. There's just not an ontological dualism here by virtue of this non-identity -- which is the notion you're critiquing, right?

[info]catachrestic

August 9 2005, 06:10:03 UTC 6 years ago

I was actually troubled about trying to find a different word rather than 'identity' while I was writing this, but just went with it anyway. In several parts, rather than say 'identity', I said something like: Irreducibility is not evidence for metaphysical difference, nor does give reason that lower levels are irrelevent in an explanation of the higher levels...

So, rather than say 'identical in an explanation...', I say: 'irrelevent in an explanation...'. I suppose it was a bit misleading for me to treat these synonymously, admittedly... but it was not without some good reason...

In the case of the phenotype and genotype, they are identical in the following ways: (1) metaphysically, there isn't a difference in fundamental substance and/or (2) You can't explain the phenotype without understanding how it can develop from the genotype.

Regarding (2), I suppose you could say that while they are not identical, this does not mean there is no overlap. People that argue from irreducibility often implictly try to force a strict dichotomy on us... "Either it's perfectly identical or it's not at all...". I suppose that this is what I am arguing against, and it's in this argument that I'm using the term 'identity' differently.

Of course, you're right that it is misleading to say they are 'identical' though. They aren't identical strictly speaking, but they do require one another in a full explanation-- or at least, irreducibility is not necessary evidence against such an entailment...

[info]effrenata

October 9 2005, 00:28:16 UTC 6 years ago

I used the term "coidentity" to signify the concept of shared, overlapping or mutually referential identity.

[info]catachrestic

August 9 2005, 06:27:27 UTC 6 years ago

See what I wrote above to [info]force_of_will, I think it might indirectly answer you better than what I wrote above.

Really, I'm using a very loose definition for 'identity', such that something can have some sense of identity to another thing if you can tell a coherent story about how the one thing develops out of the other.

My ultimate point, of course, is that such a coherent story does not require reduction.

I will probably go through and edit this entry to make this point clearer though, and probably take out the term 'identity' completely... I think you raise a good point.

[info]anosognosia

August 9 2005, 22:53:40 UTC 6 years ago

I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying and agree completely. Actually, I have used the same argument -- right down to the analogy to genetics -- against eliminative reductionists in defense of a need for a special science (Fodor) of psychology beyond a science of neurology, and that this need has nothing to do with implying mind-body dualism.

My contention over your use of 'identity' is that a reductionist would use a similar argument to imply the opposite of what I argue: as evidence against our need of a special science.

So I suppose I'm raising the contention to see if we really are making the same sort of argument.

(Actually, initially my comment went something like "you don't mean 'identity' you mean 'the absence of an ontological duality'" -- then I realized how awkward it was to find the right words for this too.)

[info]tiresias2

August 12 2005, 08:16:35 UTC 6 years ago

Wait, I'm having a stupid moment :-). Either I'm really tired right now, or there are too many double negatives in your comment (notice how I leave open the fact that it's your fault, not mine... hehe). I'm unclear: Are you in favor of a special science or against a special science?

My position is actually that an understanding of neurology is necessary for an understanding of psychology. I am not suggesting, however, anything about whether they ought to be the same science. Clearly, what happens on the psychological level has a different context of explanation than what happens on the neurological level. Moreover, the psychological level cannot be reduced to the neurological level, but this doesn't mean that it isn't still informed by the neurological level.

In short: I would agree that psychology and neurology are different things to practice and study, but I don't agree that psychologists can get by without studying any neurology. Neurology needs to be part of the psychologist's study.

[info]anosognosia

August 12 2005, 08:41:00 UTC 6 years ago

"My position is actually that an understanding of neurology is necessary for an understanding of psychology."

Absolutely. I'm only saying that an understanding of neurology is not the same as an understanding of psychology -- just like an understanding of genotype is not the same as an understanding of phenotype, even though understanding the one is essential to understanding the other.

[info]tiresias2

August 12 2005, 09:08:14 UTC 6 years ago

Okay, agreed then! :-)

I often have a problem with people arguing that psychology doesn't need neurology, in the same way that I have a problem with people arguing that sociology doesn't need biology. I'd have no problem with sociology so long as they acknowledged and understood how an understanding of sociology depends upon and is effected by an understanding of biology. But to the extent that sociology is divorced from biology, this sort of 'sociology' I consider to be a dead and useless field.

But of course, saying that sociology requires biology is not to say that they are the same thing. This is where the ugly assumption of reduction always rears its head. It's as if people feel threatened by the assertion that sociology requires biology, because I assume they think that this can only indicate an assertion of reduction. (all of this really comes down to a lot of arbitrary acacemic bickerings over territory too, and I'm sure this fuels the dogma)...

My post is really just a criticism of this lack of imagination. 'Reduction' is not the only alternative to being 'ontologically dualistic'.

[info]anosognosia

August 12 2005, 10:30:26 UTC 6 years ago

"I often have a problem with people arguing that psychology doesn't need neurology..."

People still argue that in this day and age!?

It's funny -- I try, as stridently as possible, to focus my work on the mind itself and nothing else; but this perspective naturally entails an involvement with biology because biology really does have implications for the mind. Saying "I'm only interested in the mind," even if you really, really mean it, doesn't exclude biology. As much as I would loathe having to spend another year in a physiology lab, I think they have provided the ideal foundation for what I want to study.

"...in the same way that I have a problem with people arguing that sociology doesn't need biology."

Freud argues that 'phylogeny is destiny' -- even if you accept the tabula rasa, the mind (and society) develops in this particular body. This means that instincts, even if they do not exist at all upon birth, have a functional existence insofar as the potentials and inclinations defined by anatomy provide the frame through which the mind becomes all that it ever becomes.

"My post is really just a criticism of this lack of imagination. 'Reduction' is not the only alternative to being 'ontologically dualistic'."

That's a great summary.

[info]tiresias2

August 12 2005, 09:30:11 UTC 6 years ago

By the way, I'm curious to ask you about something...

What are your views regarding movements like the Anti-Psychiatry Coalition?

[info]anosognosia

August 12 2005, 10:15:16 UTC 6 years ago

I haven't read Szasz or anyone comparable in primary source, although I'm familiar with the debate in general terms, so I can't remark except casually.

I suspect I would be sympathetic with their basic premises: I think that mental health shouldn't be synonymous with psychopharmachology, and that the latter currently has a disproportionate ideological monopology; and I think that patient's rights are often neglected by the mental health industry and that this needs to be addressed.

However, I'd probably part ways in that the anti-psychiatry movement seems even more liable than most such movements to adopt extremist views on the bases of their basic premises. I know that people argue against psychopharmachology completely, and even against the very concept of mental illness. I can't agree at all with these arguments: mental illness is very, very real, and psychopharmachological interventions can really, really have beneficial results.

I suspect I will become active (when I segue from graduate student to professional) in psychotherapy advocacy, but it will be very much from the point of view of integrating psychotherapy with psychopharmachology, rather than a polemic against the latter.

For example, there is a Lacanian psychoanalytic clinic in Quebec that has worked for a few decades with treatment-resistant schizophrenics, and demonstrated results (some available here in French; I can translate if anyone is interested) that are successful both medically and economically (the clinic would actually save the government money based on reduced hospitalization and social aid) -- however, it was closed down on a purely ideological basis: psychiatrists don't like psychoanalysis. This, I think, is nonsense. But the answer is not to turn the public against psychiatrists, but rather to inform the public about this. Positive, rather than negative activism.

The patients I am working with now are all on medication, and it's interesting to see how psychopharmachological and psychotherapeutic interventions affect one another. It's a complicated area which I think has not been well researched due to the polemic attitudes on both sides.

... mind you, I work mostly with very sick people. I would probably be more sympathetic to anti-psychiatry when it comes to the fringe areas between health and sickness like ADHD. It's not something I've thought alot about, since it's pretty far afield from my work.

[info]tiresias2

August 13 2005, 05:44:10 UTC 6 years ago

mental illness is very, very real, and psychopharmachological interventions can really, really have beneficial results

My own leanings are probably slightly more radical than yours, but all in all I don't think we're that far off. Regarding the existence of mental illness, I acknowledge that the mental properties that we ascribe 'illness' to are very, very real. Anyone who denied this, I think, would have to be extremely naive. The issues I have, however, revolve around how we come to connotate certain mental properties as symptoms of an 'illness', and others as 'healthy'. This is done in no consistent way, and there are extreme philosophical shortcomings in all but the most extreme cases involving real physiological damage to the nervous system.

Of course, there are all sorts of political problems tied up in all of this too. The Pharmaceutical companies are one of the most powerful industries, and often times how illness is defined has more to do with deviation from the functioning of the prevailing social system, rather than in a more responsible way.

In the same way that religion serves a structural-functional role in a social system, I think psychiatry fills a similar gap. And for the same reason that we need to be wary of any situation where church and state are not separated, I think we also need to be extremely cautious with the way that psychiatry and the state are not separated in our justice system.

And yes, I'm much louder in my criticism of psychiatry when it comes to things like depression or ADHD... and less so when it comes to things like schizophrenia...

But even in the extreme cases, the ways we treat so-called 'mental illness' are often abhorrant and irresponsible. Our knowledge of how and why pharmaceutical drugs work, or even whether they work at all, is extremely primitive. At best, the vast majority of psychiatric treatment is pseudo-science at it's very best, and yet it is often held in the same esteem as any medical procedure. Furthermore, it is suspicious enough the inconsistency between how we diagnose and how we treat. For instance, we treat people chemically, and yet the process of diagnosis almost never even involves taking chemical tests (of course, such chemical tests are impractical anyway-- you can't really get any indication of what is going on chemically within someone's brain without severe brain surgery...). Thus, the mode of treatment is an entirely speculative endeavor in light of how diagnosis is made...

I consider this extremely unscientific, and extremely dangerous, especially in light of all the social and political factors hovering over it all...

[info]arriya

August 10 2005, 05:07:55 UTC 6 years ago

Nice explanation. Evolutionary theory is rife with similar and related useful examples, e.g., microevolution and macroevolution, multi-level selection. The state of philosophy would probably improved greatly if all students of philosophy studied science more extensively. Bad philosophy betrays the lack of understanding/misunderstandings of those who do it.

[info]tiresias2

August 12 2005, 08:03:15 UTC 6 years ago

It's not so much a lack of scientific understanding in this case as a lack of imagination. Arguments from irreducibility assume that there can be no association at all between differing levels unless the upper level can be deductively reduced to the lower level. If this is true, this is actually a logical truth-- it doesn't depend on science at all. In a lot of ways, critical thinking is a creative enterprise (I have given further reason for this in my [info]tiresias2 journal regarding the difference between intuition and imagination). In order to show that some argument is invalid, you have to invent (or imagine) some model whereby all the premises are still true, but they lead to a different conclusion. If no model ever occurs to people, this is not always evidence that the argument is valid. Often times, it's just evidence that the people are unimaginitive.

That's my accusation here. I'm just using evolutionary science and genetics as my model. Clearly, the fact that the organism cannot be reduced to the DNA is not evidence that DNA plays no part in the explanation of how that organism develops.

Though of course, I agree with you too. Since we have these examples to work with in science, then when people continue to forward arguments from irreducibility it tells us two things. (1) They are unimaginitive. And (2) they obviously don't know jack about science either, because we already have examples available in science, regardless of their imaginitive abilities...

[info]thisisnotsteve

August 12 2005, 22:29:58 UTC 6 years ago

by the way, all of which wouldn't be here at all if it wasn't for that original DNA-1 blueprint, even though absolutely none of it could EVER, in a million billion years even, be predicted-- not even in principle-- based upon that original blueprint.

if one had an appropriately deep understanding of DNA-1 and the environment in which DNA-1 was to be expressed, i think one could predict exactly how the organism would come out. obviously this involves infinitely more information than we at present have, shit we're still struggling to understand simple protein folding, but do i think it's certainly possible in principle.

irreducibility never made sense to me. it's the antithesis of an evolutionary account of complexity, and just goes to show how deeply ingrained the teleological, mind must precede design, bias truly is.

[info]tiresias2

August 14 2005, 10:47:51 UTC 6 years ago

if one had an appropriately deep understanding of DNA-1 and the environment in which DNA-1 was to be expressed, i think one could predict exactly how the organism would come out. obviously this involves infinitely more information than we at present have, shit we're still struggling to understand simple protein folding, but do i think it's certainly possible in principle.

It's possible, yes. But it's also possible that the laws of nature are not deterministic, in which case we could never make such a prediction. My own leanings are that there are no laws of nature in the strict sense of them leading to 100% garanteed effects. Really though, there is no way to tell for certain about any of this.

irreducibility never made sense to me.

Do you mean arguments from irreducibility? I ask because if you just mean plain old irreducibility, then you might have misunderstood my post. I'm assuming that reduction cannot always be made, but arguing that this does not necessarily lead to any sort of dualism. In other words: we don't need reduction in order to explain complicated events. The fact that something is irreducible is not really evidence of anything special, other than the thing being irreducible.

[info]thisisnotsteve

August 14 2005, 19:09:33 UTC 6 years ago

My own leanings are that there are no laws of nature in the strict sense of them leading to 100% garanteed effects.

statements like these always make me uneasy, though i would be interested to hear your reasons for making it.

Really though, there is no way to tell for certain about any of this.

that is true, though it's extremely pragmatic for science to assume it almost uniformly.

Do you mean arguments from irreducibility? I ask because if you just mean plain old irreducibility, then you might have misunderstood my post.

i understood. i take the stronger stance. irreducibility really just seems silly to me. yes, there are both high and low level patterns; and yes, i believe that the arrow of causation goes both ways, but pretending as though high level phenomena are not constructed out of lower level phenomena strikes me as extremely level-centric. to understand why the mid-level patterns we see function as they do, we need a corresponding understanding of the infrastructure in which those patterns are expressed. we need all levels of explanation if we're going to actually understand phenomena.

i would be curious to hear some examples of irreducible phenomena.




[info]catachrestic

August 15 2005, 05:41:31 UTC 6 years ago

statements like these always make me uneasy, though i would be interested to hear your reasons for making it.

Why does it make you uneasy? Some of my reasons can be found in this entry. But the simple answer is this: there really is no reason to believe that the laws of nature garantee 100% certainty. (1) Such certainty does not coincide with experience and (2) there is no necessary reason to believe nature ought to operate like that...

that is true, though it's extremely pragmatic for science to assume it almost uniformly.

I disagree with this. I actually think the opposite is pragmatic. Science does not believe in any of its assumptions. To the extent that we would ever assume uniformity in nature, it should only be for the purpose of falsifying the assumption. Thus, I actually think it is more pragmatic to doubt uniformity if you're really doing science...

i would be curious to hear some examples of irreducible phenomena.

Well I give some examples in my entry. Phenotype cannot be reduced to the genotype. Mind cannot be reduced to the brain.

Of course, my argument is that we don't need reduction. The fact that these are irreducible phenomena says nothing about whether we can offer an explanation for how something like phenotype derives from the genotype, etc...

[info]thisisnotsteve

August 15 2005, 10:32:32 UTC 6 years ago

Part the First

okay this posting is getting ridiculous

But the simple answer is this: there really is no reason to believe that the laws of nature garantee 100% certainty. (1) Such certainty does not coincide with experience and (2) there is no necessary reason to believe nature ought to operate like that...

2. i agree, as i believe this to be an empircal matter and not a deductive one.

1. i disagree. there is a remarkable amount of consistency observed in nature. so much that we can create little rules with which we can both describe and predict natural happenings. yes, the rules are approximations, but i believe that to be a function of our embodiment (i'm trying to score points by using this word) and not a function of the world (a similar response should be expected to any arguments from QM).

natural laws are generalizations based upon idealized conditions. of course, these idealized conditions almost never occur in nature, but with our limited epistemic access, its really the best these bodies can accomplish. and because our laws are based upon idealized conditions which almost never occur, we must normalize the results based upon situational variations.

our laws are obviously constrained by our conceptualizations of the world, which itself is constrained by our sensorimotor interactions with the world. but i don't find this a compelling reason to reject the mammoth's ass size of evidence that the world is patterned. the history of science specifically, and the human endeavor in general, is one of discovering underlying principles which allow us to understand, and control, the world in ways that were seemingly unimaginable before. our success in control is a testament to the regularity of the perceivable world.

Science does not believe in any of its assumptions.

it's tentative metaphysics, but it's metaphysics nonetheless. you'd be hard pressed to find a scientist who doubts that the sun is a big ball of fusion. or a linguist who doesn't believe that phonemes are real.

nonetheless, science does make certain ontological assumptions which are necessary if we are to make any sense of it's methodological assumptions. an empirical methodology has already assumed that the environment exists, that subjects exist, and that subjects exist in relation to the environment in such a way that measurment is possible. one must believe, or act as though they do, for science to even take off.

another reason i linger in the bias (methodology) of determinism is that it is assumed in the scientific method. repeatability. for a hypothesis to be accepted it must first pass the test of determination.

here's a little semantic quip for you: even indeterminate results (i.e. QM) must be repeatable for scientists to take them seriously.

To the extent that we would ever assume uniformity in nature, it should only be for the purpose of falsifying the assumption.

i toss an orange into space and it coasts for 40 feet and then abruptly stops. which option are you more inclined towards:

A. there is some unknown force at work which has stopped the orange.

B. the laws of motion must not hold all the time.

[info]thisisnotsteve

August 15 2005, 10:33:39 UTC 6 years ago

Part the Second

there, these responses are now in proper order, though i'm sure your email account is having fun with this.

Of course, my argument is that we don't need reduction.

i don't agree with this, if i understand it correctly. for me, a proper description of 'mind' must include a corollary description of brain. as evidence for this i offer you the various theories of mind that predate our accompanying understanding of brain.

reduction is as necessary as...expansion?...to an understanding of an entity which is embodied on multiple levels.

this reminds me of an argument my friend and i used to have. if we could only see water from a molecular level, would we be able to know that it nourished our bodies?

my intuitions lead me to agree with dennett; that we could infer, if we had all of the information about ourselves and our environment, that the molecule H20 nourishes us.

but this is not in contradiction to what i've said about the necessity of both high level and low level patterns for our understanding. i believe our understanding is inherently limited by our level of embodiment, and my intuitions are that that this limitation precludes the type of understanding that would be necessary to predict the nourishing qualities of water.

lots of rambling,
hope it makes sense.

[info]effrenata

October 9 2005, 00:25:44 UTC 6 years ago

Human DNA is self-editing? That's fascinating -- does it allow for a kind of Lamarckian evolution to take place?

I found your journal from the Anthropology community. Mind if I friend this journal and your other one?
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